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CHAPTER 19 
 
Principles of Neutrality and Impartiality  
of Humanitarian Action in the Aftermath  
of the 2011 Libyan Conflict 
 
Kubo Mačák1 
 
Introduction 
Have the principles of neutrality and impartiality of humanitarian action become a myth, a dead 
concept emptied of its contents due to the reality of modern asymmetrical armed conflicts? This 
chapter considers the events of the Libyan civil war of 2011 against the legal backdrop of 
international humanitarian law (IHL) to argue that although these two principles have been 
placed under severe strain in Libya, any reports of their death would nonetheless be greatly 
exaggerated. Although the trend of their weakening that has been observed in the wars in Iraq 
and Afghanistan has in some ways continued, they still constitute, in law and in practice, the 
guiding principles of humanitarian action. 
Neutrality and impartiality of humanitarian action2 are not strict legal obligations incumbent 
upon every humanitarian agent acting in situations of extreme human need and suffering. They 
are, however, generally considered to be ‘fundamental principles’ or ‘pillars’ of humanitarian 
action.3 They have acquired legal relevance due to their repeated affirmation in numerous 
international legal documents of both binding and non-binding nature. Actors that have thus 
committed themselves to adhere to these principles include various States,4 the United Nations 
(both through its General Assembly5 and the Security Council6), the European Union,7 the 
                                                          
1 Lecturer in Law at the University of Exeter and DPhil Candidate in International Law at the University of Oxford 
(Somerville College). E-mail: k.macak@exeter.ac.uk. I would like to thank Ana Beduschi, Max Forte, Slávka 
Mačáková, Mona Sadek, Mike Sanderson, and Noam Zamir for their time and advice which they have generously 
shared with me during the preparation of this paper. All internet resources were last accessed on 1 April 2013.  
2 In this contribution, ‘humanitarian action’ is understood narrowly as action aimed to protect the victims of armed 
conflicts by providing them with food, water, sanitation, shelter, health services and other forms of emergency 
assistance as well as by ensuring that violations are monitored and addressed, but excluding measures whose 
implementation carries a political charge such as post-conflict development and social work. 
3 See, eg, Kenneth Anderson, “Humanitarian Inviolability in Crisis: The Meaning of Impartiality and Neutrality for 
U.N. and NGO Agencies Following the 2003-2004 Afghanistan and Iraq Conflicts”, Harvard Human Rights Journal 17 
(2004), p. 41. 
4 See, eg, Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, “Humanitarian Access in Situations of Armed Conflict: 
Field Manual—Version 1.0” (2011), http://www.cdint.org/documents/PAIV_111118_Humanitarian_Access_Field 
Manual_mit_Inhalt.pdf, section 3.2; UK Department for International Development, “Saving lives, preventing 
suffering and building resilience: The UK Government’s Humanitarian Policy” (2011), 
http://www.dfid.gov.uk/Documents/publications1/1/The UK Government's Humanitarian Policy September 
2011 Final.pdf, p. 6. 
5 UN GA Res. 46/182 (1991), Annex, para. 2. These principles were frequently reaffirmed by the General Assembly 
in the following years. See, eg, UN GA Res. 51/194 (1996), preambular para. 12; UN GA Res. 58/114 (2003), 
preambular para. 4; UN GA Res. 60/124 (2005), preambular para. 4; UN GA Res. 61/134 (2006), preambular para. 
4; UN GA Res. 62/94 (2007), preambular para. 3; UN GA Res. 63/139 (2008), preambular para. 3; UN GA Res. 
66/119 (2011), preambular para. 3. 
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International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC),8 and a plethora of humanitarian NGOs.9 As 
‘fundamental principles of the Red Cross’, they have been given further recognition in the 
Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocol I.10 
Due to a lack of a generally accepted definition, the content of these principles as 
understood by the relevant actors may slightly differ. As used in general language, the two terms 
might even appear synonymous.11 However, for the purposes of this contribution, we may 
attempt to delimit their core as follows. The principle of neutrality requires the humanitarian 
actors to remain ideologically free and to not favour any of the conflict parties.12 The principle of 
impartiality requires these actors to provide aid only on the basis of, and in proportion to, the 
need of the victims.13 The two principles are thus complementary14 and are aimed to ensure the 
distribution of assistance irrespective of the prevailing political or military balance or perceived 
military necessity15 and, correspondingly, to protect the safety of humanitarian actors by 
maintaining their perception as being concerned solely with the needs of the victims.16 
The importance of humanitarian principles thus cannot be overstated. However, in recent 
discourse, commentators have mourned their demise, arguing that they are no longer followed 
by the relevant State and non-State actors. For example, Kurt Mills complained in 2005:  
 
The traditional ideals of neutrality, impartiality, and independence have become 
myth. Rather than being at the margins of conflict, humanitarianism is now 
embedded within contemporary conflict. States use humanitarian norms and actors 
for their own ends.17  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
6 UN SC PrSt 1997/34 (19 June 1997), p. 2; UN SC Res. 1296 (2000), preambular para. 11; UN SC PrSt 2004/46 
(14 December 2004), p. 2; UN SC Res. 1674 (2006), para. 21. 
7 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Art. 214(2) (hereinafter ‘TFEU’). 
8 XXth International Conference of the Red Cross, “Proclamation of the Fundamental Principles of the Red Cross” 
56 IRRC (1965), pp. 573-4. 
9 See, eg, MSF, “MSF Charter” (3 January 2011), http://www.msf.org/msf/articles/2011/03/the-medecins-sans-
frontieres-charter.cfm; IOM, Res. 1243 (CI) “IOM Migration Crisis Operational Framework” (27 November 2012); 
International Rescue Committee, “Organization Report” (June 2011), http://rootcause.org/documents/DR-
IRC.pdf. 
10 Geneva Convention I, Art. 44(2); Geneva Convention IV, Art. 63(1)(a); Additional Protocol I, Art. 81(2)-(3) 
(hereinafter ‘GC’ and ‘AP’, respectively). 
11 See, eg, ‘Neutral’, Thesaurus.com, http://thesaurus.com/browse/neutral (‘Definition: impartial, noncommital’) 
(emphasis added).  
12 Marion Harroff-Tavel, “Neutrality and Impartiality—The Importance of These Principles for the International 
Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and the Difficulties Involved in Applying Them,” IRRC 873 (1989), p. 537; 
Anderson, “Humanitarian Inviolability”, p. 56; EU, Joint Statement by the Council and the Representatives of the 
Governments of the Member States meeting within the Council, the European Parliament and the European 
Commission: The European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid, OJ 2008 C 25/1, C 25/2, para. 12 (hereinafter ‘The 
European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid’). 
13 Harroff-Tavel, “Neutrality and Impartiality”, p. 538; Anderson, “Humanitarian Inviolability”, p. 56; The European 
Consensus on Humanitarian Aid, para. 13. 
14 Due to their complementarity, this contribution generally considers the two principles together, except where 
expressly stated otherwise.  
15 Anderson, “Humanitarian Inviolability”, p. 56. 
16 Alice Gadler, “Armed Forces as Carrying Both the Stick and the Carrot? Humanitarian Aid in U.S. 
Counterinsurgency Operations in Afghanistan and Iraq,” Goettingen Journal of International Law 3-1 (2011), p. 227. 
17 Kurt Mills, “Neo-Humanitarianism: The Role of International Humanitarian Norms and Organizations in 
Contemporary Conflict” Global Governance 11-2 (2005), p. 161. 
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The two defining large-scale wars of the first decade of the twenty-first century, Iraq and 
Afghanistan, have occasioned a wave of criticism decrying the abandonment of impartiality and 
neutrality in those conflicts. Critics have highlighted as problematic the instrumentalisation of 
humanitarian action by Western militaries,18 conflation of humanitarian and development roles 
of humanitarian agents,19 and the general blurring of lines between political, military, and 
humanitarian agendas.20 
This is the background of the analysis provided in this chapter, which is divided into three 
main parts. Part I provides the legal framework applicable to the provision of humanitarian 
action during the Libyan conflict from the perspective of IHL. Part II analyses how principles of 
neutrality and impartiality of humanitarian action have been respected by the quantitative and 
qualitative nature of aid provided in Libya by external actors. Part III analyses to what extent the 
conflict posed a challenge to neutrality and impartiality with respect to agents of humanitarian 
action, contrasting the different problems faced by humanitarian agencies on the one hand and 
multi-purpose actors on the other. The conclusion draws lessons to be learned from the analysis 
presented and supports on its basis the central claim of this chapter that the two principles, even 
if badly battered during the war, are still alive and kicking. 
 
I. Legal framework 
Norms of IHL apply only in situations of armed conflict. In order to analyse humanitarian action 
provided in the scope of the Libyan war of 2011 through the lens of IHL, we thus first need to 
determine which phases of violence since its outbreak in February of that year met the legal 
criteria for one of the two main types of armed conflict.21 It is argued here that the situation in 
Libya became a non-international armed conflict (NIAC) towards the end of February. The 
NIAC between the government and the rebel forces was then complemented by an international 
armed conflict (IAC) between the State of Libya and the foreign intervening forces. It is as of 
now factually unclear whether the growing collusion between the intervening States and the 
Benghazi-based insurgents surpassed the level required to transform the latter into another party 
of the IAC. In any event, norms of NIAC and IAC both applied to the events in Libya at various 
times.22 
The NIAC in Libya commenced when the fighting reached a level of intensity and when the 
rebels achieved a level of organisation required by law and international jurisprudence.23 The 
intensity requirement was met when non-violent protests in several Libyan cities grew into armed 
confrontations in late February 2011, with heavy armed force deployed by the government24 and 
                                                          
18 Vincent Bernard, “Editorial: The Future of Humanitarian Action,” IRRC 884 (2011), p. 892; Fiona Terry, “The 
International Committee of the Red Cross in Afghanistan: Reasserting the Neutrality of Humanitarian Action,” 
IRRC  881 (2011), p. 175; Mills, “Neo-Humanitarianism”,  pp. 177-9. 
19 Antonio Donini, “Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Integration or Independence of Humanitarian Action?” 
IRRC 881, p. 152; Anderson, “Humanitarian Inviolability”, pp. 42-3. 
20 Claudia McGoldrick, “The Future of Humanitarian Action: An ICRC Perspective,” IRRC 884 (2011), p. 966; 
Anderson, “Humanitarian Inviolability”, p. 64; Gadler, “Armed Forces”, p. 231. 
21 On classification of armed conflicts see generally Dapo Akande, “Classification of Armed Conflicts: Relevant 
Legal Concepts” in: Elizabeth Wilmshurst (ed.), International Law and the Classification of Conflicts, (OUP: Oxford, 
2012), pp. 32-79. 
22 The analysis in this section is based on a recent article on the qualification of the Libyan conflict, co-written by the 
present author. See Kubo Mačák and Noam Zamir, “The Applicability of International Humanitarian Law to the 
Conflict in Libya,” International Community Law Review 14-4 (2012), p. 403. 
23 Prosecutor v. Tadić (Jurisdiction Appeal) IT-94-1-AR72 (2 October 1995), para. 70 (‘[A non-international] armed 
conflict exists whenever there is [...] protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and organized armed 
groups or between such groups within a State’) (emphases added). 
24 See, eg, BBC, “Libya Unrest: Scores Killed in Benghazi ‘Massacre’,” 20 February 2011, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-12517327; Haaretz, “Report: Libya Air Force Bombs Protesters Heading 
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with the insurgents forcefully taking over garrisons and towns all across Libya.25 The organisation 
requirement was met when the resistance fighters formed geographically rooted militias (‘kataeb’) 
led by military commanders and capable of enforcing compliance with IHL within their ranks.26 
In addition, opposition armed forces established themselves in the eastern city of Benghazi and 
by late February, they were controlling several other cities including Shahat, Tobruk, and 
Misrata.27 The key requirement of partial territorial control, triggering the applicability of 
Additional Protocol II, was thus also met by that point of time in Libya.28  
According to the ICTY’s interpretation of the terms of Common Article 2 to the Geneva 
Conventions, an IAC begins when there is ‘a resort to armed force between States’.29 In the 
Libyan conflict, this situation materially came about on 19 March when the US, the UK, and 
France used its naval and airborne forces to attack targets in Libya.30 The fact that NATO 
assumed formal and operational control of all international forces on 31 March did not change 
the qualification of the conflict; it only made NATO a party to the conflict, equally bound by the 
rules of IHL.31 For now, it remains an open question whether this parallel IAC merged at some 
point with the NIAC described in the previous paragraph. A plausible argument to that effect 
could be made if it were proven that the rebels forfeited their operational autonomy and 
accepted a degree of control by NATO.32 However, the reports of the establishment in Benghazi 
of a ‘joint operations centre’, allegedly tasked with the co-ordination of NATO and rebels’ 
operations against Gaddafi, have not been authoritatively confirmed to this day.33 
On this basis, this contribution considers the situation in Libya as featuring two parallel 
conflicts, a NIAC between the government and the rebels, and an IAC between the government 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
For Army Base,” 21 February 2011, www.haaretz.com/news/world/report-libya-air-force-bombs-protesters-
heading-for-army-base-1.344775; STRATFOR, “Unrest and the Libyan Military,” 21 February 2011, 
www.stratfor.com/analysis/20110220-unrest-libyan-military. 
25 Arab Organization for Human Rights, “Report of the Independent Civil Society Fact-Finding Mission to Libya” 
(January 2012), para. 48; UN Human Rights Council, “Report of the International Commission of Inquiry to 
Investigate All Alleged Violations of International Human Rights Law in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya,” UN Doc. 
A/HRC/17/44 (12 January 2012), paras. 28, 55. 
26 UN Human Rights Council, “Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Libya,” UN Doc. 
A/HRC/19/68 (2 March 2012), Annex I, paras. 61-63 (hereinafter ‘International Commission of Inquiry March 
2012 Report’). 
27 Alexander Dziadosz, “Benghazi, Cradle of Revolt, Condemns Gaddafi,” The Star, 23 February 2011, 
http://thestar.com.my/news/story.asp?file=/2011/2/24/worldupdates/2011-02-
23T222628Z_01_NOOTR_RTRMDNC_0_-550982-4&sec=Worldupdates (confirming the establishment of 
control over Benghazi); International Commission of Inquiry March 2012 Report, para. 55 (regarding Shahat, 
Tobruk, and Misrata). 
28 AP II, Art. 1(1). 
29 Tadić Jurisdiction Appeal, para. 70; see also Jean Pictet (ed.), Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian 
Persons in Time of War: Commentary, (ICRC: Geneva, 1958), p. 20. 
30 See, eg, The Guardian, “Allied Strikes Sweep Libya as West Intervenes in Conflict,” 20 March 2011, 
www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/mar/19/libya-air-strikes-gaddafi-france; BBC News, “Libya: US, UK and France 
Attack Gaddafi Forces,” 20 March 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-12796972. 
31 For detailed analysis, see Mačák and Zamir, “The Applicability”,  pp. 416-8. 
32 The co-operation between NATO and the rebels would thus meet the ‘overall control’ test propounded by the 
jurisprudence of the ICTY, which requires (1) the provision of financial and training assistance, military equipment 
and/or operational support to the non-State party and (2) the participation in the organisation, coordination or 
planning of military operations by the intervening State. See Prosecutor v. Tadić (Appeal Judgement) IT-94-1-A (15 July 
1999), paras. 131, 145, 162. 
33 See Bruno Waterfield, “Libya: British Military Advisers Set up ‘Joint Operations Centre’ in Benghazi,” The 
Telegraph, 18 May 2011, www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/libya/8521977/Libya-British-
military-advisers-set-up-joint-operations-centre-in-Benghazi.html (confirmation by the UK); Maher Chmaytelli and 
Peter S. Green, “Libya Rebels, NATO Don’t Have Joint Operations, Official Says,” Bloomberg, 16 April 2011, 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-04-16/libya-rebels-nato-don-t-have-joint-operations-official-says.html 
(confirmation by the rebels and denial by NATO). 
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and the intervening forces. The IHL obligations of this triangle of conflict parties, including the 
duties pertaining to the provision of humanitarian assistance, thus differed depending on the 
conflict pair that formed the factual background for the relevant events. The main difference 
relevant for our purposes, besides the generally more robust and detailed regulation of IACs, is 
the requirement of State consent to humanitarian assistance provided in its territory in the scope 
of a NIAC.34  
 
II. Nature of humanitarian action 
The Libyan conflict affected virtually the entire territory of the State of Libya. Civilians living in 
almost all areas of the country were exposed to the dangers of armed violence and to shortages 
of basic supplies and services including, among many other things, food, water, fuel, and medical 
attention. Both sides of the conflict in official statements repeatedly acknowledged the dire 
nature of the situation and requested outside humanitarian assistance. For example, Lynn Pascoe, 
the UN Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, reported in May 2011 to the UN Security 
Council that the Libyan government demanded from the UN to arrange for the resumption of 
the supply of fuel to ‘ensure the continuation of basic services’ and that the rebel-led National 
Transitional Council complained that it had ‘only 40 per cent of the funds needed to cover its 
budget for April and May’.35 Both sides continued to report severe shortages and requested later 
that the Libyan State assets that had been frozen under the terms of the UN Security Council 
resolution 1973 (2011)36 be released and used ‘to meet humanitarian needs’.37  
Although it is beyond the scope of this contribution to provide a definitive assessment of 
the humanitarian aid provided to the individual belligerents in Libya, a number of indications 
cast a shadow on the purported neutrality and impartiality of the assistance provided in two 
different but intertwined ways. These relate to the qualitative and quantitative nature of aid 
provided during the conflict.  
 
a. Quantitative assessment  
The first problematic quantitative aspect is that the majority of aid designated for Libya 
originated in those countries that participated in the multinational military intervention that 
ended up supporting the insurgents. Out of ten European countries that contributed the most,38 
only two did not take part in the NATO-led military operations: Germany and Finland,39 of 
which the latter has long been committed to a policy of military neutrality and non-alignment.40 
It could plausibly be objected that countries that intervened militarily only happened to be those 
that ordinarily provide humanitarian aid, in line with the general trend according to which it is 
                                                          
34 See subsection III.A below. 
35 UN Doc. S/PV.6541 (31 May 2011), p. 2. 
36 See text to note 113 below. 
37 UN Doc. S/PV.6595 (28 July 2011), p. 2. 
38 The Guardian, “Humanitarian Aid in Libya: How Much Has Each Country Donated?” 22 August 2011, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/news/datablog/2011/aug/22/libya-humanitarian-aid-by-country. 
39 The Guardian, “Nato Operations in Libya: Data Journalism Breaks Down Which Country Does What” 22 May 
2011, http://www.guardian.co.uk/news/datablog/2011/may/22/nato-libya-data-journalism-operations-country.  
40 Marco Wyss, “Military Transformation in Europe’s Neutral and Non-Neutral Allies,” The RUSI Journal 156-2 
(2011), pp. 46-7. The Finnish foreign minister expressed the support of his country for the UN Security Council 
Resolution 1973 (2011) but stated that this support ‘would take the form of humanitarian aid, including help with 
the evacuation of refugees’. Hans Lödén, “Reaching a Vanishing Point? Reflections on the Future of Neutrality 
Norms in Sweden and Finland,” Cooperation and Conflict 47-2 (2012), pp. 275-6. 
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the global West that provides the majority of aid.41 This objection, however, only brings us to the 
second problematic aspect, namely that the rebels and areas under their control profited 
disproportionately more from international aid than the government and government-controlled 
areas.  
In large part, this disproportion arose from the actions of an informal ‘contact group’ 
established in late March 201142 and comprised of about forty nations that made no secret of 
their dislike of Gaddafi.43 At its meeting in June 2011, the members of the contact group pledged 
more than $1bn in support for the Libyan opposition.44 In addition, at the behest of this group,45 
the rebels were allowed to benefit from about $1.5bn of Libyan assets that were unfrozen by the 
Sanctions Committee of the UN Security Council in August 2011.46  
It also appears from early reports from the conflict that virtually all outside assistance was 
intended for the eastern, rebel-controlled part of Libya47 and that as the conflict was underway, 
areas controlled by the government suffered from worse shortages than their better supplied 
rebel-held counterparts.48 These facts in their combination therefore indicate that the aid 
designated to alleviate the hardships of the Libyan conflict originated disproportionately in the 
countries intervening in support of one side of the conflict and that it benefited 
disproportionately persons associated with that side. 
 
b. Qualitative assessment  
Qualitatively, some of the aid disbursed to the rebels, but not to the government forces, 
exceeded what can legitimately be considered humanitarian assistance and constituted assistance 
of the kind that could significantly affect the insurgents’ war effort. According to the ICJ’s ruling 
in Nicaragua, provision of assistance going beyond ‘food, clothing, medicine and other 
humanitarian assistance’, and especially of ‘weapons, weapons systems, ammunition, or other 
equipment, vehicles, or material which can be used to inflict serious bodily harm or death’ 
cannot be considered as humanitarian aid.49 Their provision to the rebels would thus amount to 
unlawful interference with the internal affairs of Libya and to a violation of the principles of 
impartiality and neutrality. 
But perhaps such assistance could be justified on the basis of the Security Council 
authorisation contained in Resolution 1973. The arguments that the international coalition 
overstepped the mandate to protect civilians and civilian-populated areas given to it by the 
                                                          
41 Cf. Bernard, “Editorial”,  p. 891 (noting that the headquarters of all main humanitarian agencies are in the 
Western world). 
42 UN Doc. S/PV.6509, p. 2. 
43 BBC News, “Libya: Gaddaﬁ Must Step Down, Says ‘Contact Group’,” 14 April 2011, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-13058694.  
44 The New York Times, “$1 Billion Is Pledged to Support Libya Rebels,” 9 June 2011, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/10/world/africa/10diplo.html?_r=0. 
45 The New York Times, “U.S. Seeks to Aid Libyan Rebels With Seized Assets,” 5 May 2011, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/06/world/africa/06diplo.html?_r=0; NPR, “Diplomats In Rome Discuss Aid 
To Libyan Rebels,” 5 May 2011, http://www.npr.org/2011/05/05/136011941/diplomats-discuss-aid-to-libyan-
rebels. 
46 See UN Doc. S/PV.6606 (30 August 2011), p. 3 (UN Secretary-General’s confirmation of the unfreezing). 
47 See, eg, The New York Times, “French Aid Bolsters Libyan Revolt,” 28 February 2011, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/01/world/europe/01france.html; The New York Times, “Opposition in Libya 
Struggles to Form a United Front,” 8 March 2011 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/09/world/africa/09rebels.html. 
48 UN Doc. S/PV.6595 (28 July 2011), p. 3. 
49 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Merits, Judgment, ICJ 
Reports 1986, paras. 97 and 242. 
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Security Council in order to effectuate regime change in Libya will be discussed below.50 
However, is it correct to argue that the enabling resolution, understood as limited to the civilian-
protection aim, allowed for the transfer of military supplies in furtherance of this mandate? If such 
aid was permitted by the terms of the resolution, this permission would prevail over the 
requirements arising from the principles of neutrality and impartiality by virtue of Article 103 of 
the UN Charter.51 
It should be recalled that the predecessor Resolution 1970 expressly established an arms 
embargo in its operative paragraph 9. Under its terms, any ‘direct or indirect supply, sale or 
transfer’ or arms and related materiel to Libya was prohibited, irrespective of who (if anyone) 
would benefit from such a transaction.52 It is true that Resolution 1973 authorised UN Member 
States to take all necessary measures ‘notwithstanding paragraph 9 of resolution 1970 (2011)’.53 
However, as a resolution permitting the use of force in international relations, Resolution 1973 
represents an exception from the general prohibition on the use of force54 and thus its terms 
should be interpreted restrictively, in line with the general principle of law that exceptions from a 
rule are to be construed narrowly.55 The most likely motive for the inclusion of the quoted 
phrase in the newer resolution was to allow the coalition to transport their own military materiel to 
Libya.56 Moreover, the resolution does allow the implementing States to act either ‘nationally’ or 
‘through regional organizations or arrangements’, but it does not, notably, allow for action in 
collusion with other (sub-State) entities.57 The narrow interpretation advocated here thus 
precludes the transfer of military equipment to one of the parties even under the terms of 
Resolution 1973.58 It is also in line with the unequivocal statement of the NATO Secretary 
General from March 2011 that the resolution did not allow the arming of the rebels, although, 
admittedly, his view was not shared by all NATO member States.59 
There have been a number of reports that outside States provided military assistance to the 
insurgents in Libya. Few countries expressly admitted doing so. Qatar did in April 2011, 
seemingly on the basis of its earlier recognition of the National Transitional Council (NTC) as 
the legitimate government of Libya.60 It was rightly pointed out, however, that prior to 
                                                          
50 See section III.B.1 below. 
51 UN Charter, Art. 103; see also Lockerbie case (Libya v. United Kingdom) (Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures), 
ICJ Reports 1992, p. 15, para. 39 (obligations imposed by the Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the UN 
Charter trump any conflicting international law obligations). 
52 UN SC Res. 1970 (2011), para. 9. 
53 UN SC Res. 1973 (2011), para. 4. 
54 See, eg, Malcolm N. Shaw, International Law, 6th ed. (CUP: Cambridge, 2008), pp. 1123-4. 
55 Cf. Roman law principles of ‘Exceptiones sunt strictae interpretationis’ or ‘Singularia non sunt extendenda’. See also Dan 
Sarooshi, United Nations and the Development of Collective Security: the Delegation by the UN Security Council of its Chapter VII 
Powers (OUP: Oxford, 1999), pp. 44-6 (the requirement of narrow construction of powers delegated by the Security 
Council is a consequence of the application of the delegatus non potest delegare doctrine to the Council); Ben Saul, “The 
Legality of the Use of Force against Iraq in 2003: Did the Coalition Defend or Defy the United Nations,” UCLA J. 
Int'l L. & Foreign Aff 8 (2003), p. 315 (resolutions authorising the use of force must be construed narrowly to protect 
the Council’s control over its own process).  
56 C Pippan, “The 2011 Libyan Uprising, Foreign Military Intervention, and International Law,” Juridikum: Zeitschrift 
für Kritik-Recht-Gesellschaft 2 (2011), p. 167. 
57 Cf. UN SC Res. 1973 (2011), paras. 4 and 8.  
58 Contra Dapo Akande, “Does SC Resolution 1973 Permit Coalition Military Support for the Libyan Rebels?,” 
EJIL: Talk!, 31 March 2011, http://www.ejiltalk.org/does-sc-resolution-1973-permit-coalition-military-support-for-
the-libyan-rebels/; Pippan, “The 2011 Libyan Uprising”, pp. 167-8. 
59 Sky News, “Confusion Reigns Over Arming Libyan Rebels,” 31 March 2011, 
http://news.sky.com/story/844958/confusion-reigns-over-arming-libyan-rebels. 
60 The New York Times, “Libyan Rebels Say They’re Being Sent Weapons,” 16 April 2011, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/17/world/africa/17libya.html. 
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consolidation of control over territory by the rebels, such recognition would have been 
premature and thus unlawful under international law.61  
France acknowledged its military aid and attempted to justify it under the humanitarian 
rationale of protecting the civilians from the government troops.62 Once the weapons are 
distributed, however, the donor country has, even if genuine in its aims, very little leverage over 
how they would eventually be used. What is more, according to journalistic reports and counter 
to the official proclamations, France has at least contemplated that French arms would be used 
by the rebels in their efforts to topple the regime in power.63 
Other countries may have been providing arms and military training to the rebels more 
covertly. Even prior to the military intervention, the US, UK, and France were reported to have 
sent several hundred ‘defence advisors’ to train and support the insurgent forces in eastern 
Libya.64 Additional covert deployments of special forces by Egypt, France, Italy, Qatar, the UAE, 
and the UK were reported during and after the conflict, usually accompanied by denials from the 
authorities.65 Finally, the rebels themselves confirmed having received military assistance from 
countries ‘that supported their uprising’, without specifying the exact sources of that support.66 
It will be a task for historians and perhaps criminal investigators to confirm or deny 
authoritatively these reports of military assistance to the rebels. For the purposes of this 
contribution, it is sufficient to say that to the extent that aid to the rebels exceeded the range of 
permissible humanitarian assistance outlined in Nicaragua, it could not be considered justified 
under general international law or under the terms of Resolution 1973. In addition, as its 
provision was not mirrored in principle nor in extent by any commensurate aid provided to the 
governmental side, it cannot be seen as consistent with the principles of neutrality and 
impartiality, either. 
 
III. Agents of humanitarian action 
The conflict posed a further challenge to impartiality and neutrality of humanitarian action with 
respect to agents of humanitarian action. The two principal types of agents active in Libya were 
humanitarian agencies, with the ICRC at the forefront, and multi-purpose actors, such as outside 
States and especially international organisations, featuring prominently the UN, NATO, and the 
EU. Each of these two types faced somewhat different difficulties relevant to our scrutiny. 
 
a. Humanitarian agencies 
First of all, humanitarian agencies struggled primarily for equal access to the conflict victims. 
This section describes some of the problems of access during the conflict and places them within 
the framework of IHL. The discussion is unavoidably sketchy. On the one hand, the present 
analysis can correct some of the earlier generalisations such as that the ICRC was able to conduct 
                                                          
61 Stefan Talmon, “Recognition of the Libyan National Transitional Council,” ASIL Insight, 16 June 2011, 
http://www.asil.org/insights110616.cfm. 
62 France 24, “French Military Air-Dropped Arms to Libya Rebels,” 29 June 2011, 
http://www.france24.com/en/20110629-french-military-confirms-airdropping-arms-libya-kadhafi-rebel#. 
63 Ibid. 
64 Pakistan Observer, “US, UK, French Forces Land in Libya,” 26 February 2011, 
http://pakobserver.net/detailnews.asp?id=78009. 
65 Paul D. Williams and Alex J. Bellamy, “Principles, Politics, and Prudence: Libya, the Responsibility to Protect, and 
the Use of Military Force,” Global Governance 18 (2012), p. 291; Al Jazeera, “Libyan Rebels ‘Receive Foreign 
Training’,” 3 April 2011, http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2011/04/201142172443133798.html. 
66 The New York Times, “Libyan Rebels Say They’re Being Sent Weapons,” 16 April 2011, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/17/world/africa/17libya.html. 
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its operations for the whole duration of air operations in the entire territory of Libya;67 in fact, 
the ICRC itself complained several times of difficulties of access.68 On the other hand, the text 
has no ambition to paint an exhaustive picture of the humanitarian situation in Libya and 
examples chosen may be representative but due to the scope of this chapter have to remain 
anecdotal. 
Unquestionably, the primary responsibility for the provision of humanitarian aid to the 
victims of wars lies with the territorial State.69 This is simply a reflection of the State’s 
sovereignty which entails the responsibility for those living within its territory.70 In the territory 
in which the State has lost control to a non-State armed group, such as the NTC-led rebels in the 
Libyan conflict, this primary responsibility is complemented by a corresponding duty that arises 
for the non-State actor in question. This can be inferred from ‘the dependence of the population 
on the humanitarian aid offered to it and ... the principles of humanity and inviolability binding 
on all parties’.71 In the Libyan context, the responsibility of both conflict parties to ensure the 
protection of civilians was underscored by Resolution 1973.72 In any event, practical 
impossibility, difficulty or even unwillingness may prevent the conflict parties from fulfilling their 
primary duties towards the civilian population. In that case, the subsidiary role of relief societies, 
both domestic and foreign, comes to the fore.73 
Although the conflict parties are prohibited from using starvation of civilians, broadly 
understood,74 as a method of combat,75 whether or not they are obliged to enable free passage of 
all humanitarian assistance to all civilians depends on the conflict qualification. In IACs, conflict 
parties must only grant free passage to medications intended for all civilians, whereas other 
forms of humanitarian assistance such as foodstuffs and clothing are to be obligatorily granted 
passage only to specified vulnerable groups of children under fifteen, expectant mothers, and 
maternity cases.76 All other relief action is ‘subject to the agreement of the Parties concerned’ in 
such actions, which naturally includes the belligerent parties.77 It is debated whether, if the aid 
offered meets the requisite conditions,78 the agreement may be withheld only if the aid amounted 
to a threat to the sovereignty of the target State79 or for any reason, as long as it is not arbitrary 
                                                          
67 Bruno Pommier, “The Use of Force to Protect Civilians and Humanitarian Action: The Case of Libya and 
Beyond,” IRRC 884 (2011), p. 1081. 
68 See, eg, ICRC, “Libya: ICRC Makes Urgent Call for Access to Wounded,” 24 March 2011, 
http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/update/2011/libya-update-2011-03-24.htm (with respect to most 
areas affected by conflict in March); ICRC, “Libya: First Access to the Remote Area of Sabha,” 3 June 2011, 
http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/update/2011/libya-update-2011-06-03.htm (with respect to the 
southern city of Sabha, where the ICRC got only in June); ICRC, “Libya: Safe Access Needed to Sirte and Bani 
Walid,” 23 September 2011, http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/news-release/2011/libya-news-2011-
09-23.htm (with regard to Sirte and Bani Walid in September). 
69 Yves Sandoz, Christophe Swinarski, and Bruno Zimmermann, eds., Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 June 
1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 (ICRC: Geneva, 1987), p. 1477, para. 4871 (hereinafter ‘APs 
Commentary’). 
70 See, inter alia, UN GA Res. 46/182, Annex, para. 4. 
71 Ruth Abril Stoffels, “Legal Regulation of Humanitarian Assistance in Armed Conflict: Achievements and Gaps,” 
IRRC 855 (2004), p. 520. 
72 UN SC Res. 1973 (2011), preambular para. 4. 
73 GC IV, Art. 23; AP I, Art. 70(1); GCs, Common Art. 3; AP II, Art. 18. 
74 The prohibition does not only cover food, but also ‘objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian 
population’, including agricultural areas, drinking water installations, and irrigation works. 
75 AP I, Art. 54; AP II, Art. 14. 
76 GC IV, Art. 23(1). 
77 AP I, Art. 70(1);  
78 AP I, Art. 70(1) (the civilian population is not adequately provided with fundamental supplies and the aid is 
‘humanitarian and impartial in character and conducted without any adverse distinction’).  
79 APs Commentary, p. 819, para. 2805 (basing this interpretation on the travaux préparatoires of AP I).  
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or capricious.80 In contrast, in NIACs, any and all relief action is always subjected to the consent 
of the territorial State.81 Interestingly, there is no corresponding written legal requirement of 
consent given by the non-State party in control of a part of the territory, although in practice, its 
consent is clearly indispensable, as well.82 In any event, by demanding unconditionally that ‘the 
Libyan authorities’ ensure the rapid and unimpeded passage of humanitarian assistance,83 the 
Security Council has significantly weakened the possibility of the conflict parties to claim a right 
to deny their consent to offers of relief action. 
Perhaps at least partially aware of these considerations, neither of the conflict parties 
attempted to justify any significant instance of prevention of access by legal arguments going to 
the necessity vel non of consent or agreement given by such party. It can thus be assumed that 
neither the government nor the rebels were aware of any justifiable reason for such denials and 
these measures should accordingly be considered as prima facie indications of violations of the 
rules on humanitarian access. 
It should not be denied that relief action may be prevented by objectively existing security-
related constraints, especially while hostilities are ongoing. Humanitarian agencies reported the 
existence of such situations on numerous occasions. For example, the NGO Médecins Sans 
Frontières (MSF) complained that insecurity made it impossible to bring humanitarian aid to 
Tripoli in February 201184 and Misrata and Ras Lanuf in March 2011.85 Provided that these 
conditions are not deliberately brought upon in order to hamper the provision of aid, they do 
not result in accountability under IHL and must be accepted as an unfortunate fact of war.86 
However, certain incidents left no doubt that the parties did not fully respect their access 
obligations. We will look at three situations, broadly speaking, in more detail: the beginning of 
the conflict in February and March, the siege of Misrata by Gaddafi’s forces between March and 
May, and the siege of Sirte by the NTC in September and October.  
First, in the first phase of the conflict prior to the international intervention, the Libyan 
government put on a resolute face towards mounting international pressure, including calls for 
enabling humanitarian access. It refused to permit the humanitarian convoys to enter those cities, 
such as Misrata and Ajdabiya, which it was attempting to recapture.87 Moreover, according to 
media reports and NGO statements, Gaddafi’s forces were preventing medical teams from 
                                                          
80 Yoram Dinstein, The Conduct of Hostilities under the Law of International Armed Conflict, 2nd ed. (CUP: New York, 
2010), p. 227. 
81 AP II, Art. 18(2). 
82 Michael Bothe, “Relief Actions,” in: Rudolf Bernhardt (ed.), Encyclopedia of Public International Law, vol. 4 (Elsevier: 
Amsterdam, 1992), p. 171, cited in Heike Spieker, “Humanitarian Assistance, Access in Armed Conflict and 
Occupation,” in: Rüdiger Wolfrum (ed.), The Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law, (OUP: Oxford,  2008-
, online edition, www.mpepil.com), para. 29. 
83 UN SC Res. 1973 (2011), para. 3. 
84 MSF, “MSF Team in Libya Trying to Reach Areas Affected by Violence,” 24 February 2011, 
http://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/news/article.cfm?id=5053&cat=field-news. 
85 MSF, “Libya: Aid Access to Violence-Affected Areas Blocked,” 2 March 2011, 
http://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/press/release.cfm?id=5076&cat=press-release; MSF, “Libya: MSF Seeking 
More Ways to Assist Wounded,” 8 March 2011, 
http://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/news/article.cfm?id=5085&cat=field-news. 
86 Cf. ICRC, “International Humanitarian Law and the Challenges of Contemporary Armed Conflicts” (October 
2011), http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/red-cross-crescent-movement/31st-international-conference/31-int-
conference-ihl-challenges-report-11-5-1-2-en.pdf, p. 24 (observing that security-related constraints are among the 
main reasons limiting humanitarian access in practice). 
87 Williams and Bellamy, “Principles, Politics and Prudence”,  p. 278. 
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reaching the wounded in the places of hostilities.88 These reports would indicate a violation of 
the rules on humanitarian access by the government at the time. 
Following the international intervention in March 2011, the Libyan government agreed to 
negotiate to allow foreign aid inside the country. The crowning achievement of this effort was an 
agreement signed with the UN on 17 April, according to which Libya allowed international 
humanitarian access to all areas affected by the conflict.89 In the official government 
proclamations, Libya insisted that it was acting consistently with this agreement.90 
Second, between the months of March and May, some of the most protracted fighting of 
the conflict unfolded in the city of Misrata situated on the Mediterranean coast in north-western 
Libya.91 Gaddafi’s forces placed the city under siege and very early on, a Libyan army general 
reportedly gave an order not to allow any ‘supply cars, fuel and other services to enter the city of 
Misrata from all gates and checkpoints’.92 It appears, however, that both sides of the conflict 
contributed to inflicting hardship on the inhabitants of Misrata. For the most part of the siege, 
the rebels controlled the access to the city by sea and the government forces were in control of 
the land access.93 The United Nations humanitarian chief Valerie Amos complained in April that 
‘the opposition’ was preventing humanitarian access via the city’s port.94 The complaints against 
the government’s conduct during the siege were even more severe. Gaddafi’s forces continued to 
block access to Misrata by road despite the humanitarian agreement with the UN, thus 
occasioning serious shortages among the civilian population.95 After the rebels allowed the usage 
of the Misrata port for humanitarian purposes, it became ‘the only lifeline for humanitarian aid 
and an evacuation route for the war-wounded’.96 This did not, however, stop the government 
forces from attempting to destroy the port by numerous attacks97 and from launching land-mines 
on it.98 In summary, these actions prevented humanitarian aid from accessing war-torn Misrata 
and delayed the evacuation of the victims of the war.  
There is little to add from the legal standpoint. Siege warfare is not prohibited as such in 
NIACs.99 It must not, however, bring about the starvation of civilians.100 The means used by the 
government, and to a lesser extent, the rebel forces as well as the indications of intent found in 
                                                          
88 MSF, “Libya: Urgent Priority Must Be Given to Doctors and Medical Materials,” 25 February 2011, 
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91 International Commission of Inquiry March 2012 Report, para. 73. 
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95 Amnesty International, “The Battle for Libya” (2011), p. 34; International Commission of Inquiry March 2012 
Report, para. 554; Amnesty International, “Misratah – Under Siege and Under Fire” (2011), p. 6.  
96 International Commission of Inquiry March 2012 Report, para. 87; see also Amnesty International, “The Battle 
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97 Amnesty International, “The Battle for Libya” (2011), p. 34; International Commission of Inquiry March 2012 
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the proclamations by the government, indicate that violations of the relevant rules of IHL had 
been committed in relation to Misrata. 
Finally, we turn to the closing phase of the conflict in September and October, when 
following the fall of Tripoli, the remnants of Gaddafi’s forces retreated to the last remaining 
loyalist outposts in Sirte and Bani Walid. Tables have turned and now the insurgents encircled 
these cities and mounted military pressure against them. As the siege began, the rebels threatened 
to cut-off essential supplies and did not hide their intention to starve the inhabitants to induce 
surrender.101 They reportedly prevented humanitarian aid workers from entering Sirte, 
exacerbating the existing shortages of basic necessities, medical supplies, electricity and water.102 
At the same time, civilians were not allowed to leave the city and were subjected to prolonged 
controls at checkpoints by the NTC forces.103 Again, the situation was further aggravated by the 
other side: Gaddafi loyalists reportedly robbed food stores, leaving unaligned civilians with even 
fewer resources available.104 It took at least two weeks until the ICRC finally managed to 
negotiate access to Sirte and provide the first humanitarian aid to the inhabitants.105 All of this 
conduct, if factually true, constituted a violation of humanitarian access obligations. 
What impact does the described pattern of conduct have on the principles of neutrality and 
impartiality of humanitarian action? Both parties nominally acknowledged the application of the 
rules on humanitarian access to the situation in Libya.106 By preventing the outside aid from 
reaching the civilians whose allegiance lay with the enemy or even those who only happened to 
find themselves in the territory controlled by the other side, the conflict parties certainly 
hindered fully impartial disbursement of aid. They did not, however, attempt to justify their 
conduct by any legal reasons; in fact, when justification was given, it was claimed that access was 
prevented due to ‘security reasons’.107 The attempts to deny the existence of alleged violations 
only strengthen the principles which would thus have been violated.108 The deplorable events 
described in this section thus deserve to be referred to post-conflict accountability processes,109 
but they have not undermined the analysed principles. 
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b. Multi-purpose actors 
The second type of humanitarian agents acting inside Libya were the multi-purpose actors like 
States and intergovernmental organisations including the UN, NATO, and the EU. The label 
‘multi-purpose’ denotes the fact that these actors were pursuing their political and military goals 
simultaneously with their humanitarian aims. In other recent conflicts, most notably Iraq and 
Afghanistan, principles of impartiality and neutrality were seen as most endangered precisely by 
the ‘blurring of lines’ between the variously defined tasks of such multi-purpose actors.110 In this 
section, we focus on two main issues facing these actors: the question of overstepping the 
mandate given to the implementing States by the Security Council in Resolution 1973 and the 
question of separation of humanitarian and other activities in the conduct of intergovernmental 
organisations.  
 
1. Security Council mandate 
Did the execution of the mandate given to the States by the Security Council in March 2011 
overstep its legal boundaries? It is uncontested that the international coalition’s use of military 
force targeted exclusively forces belonging to one side of the conflict. We can thus hardly speak 
of ‘neutrality’ with respect to the military action undertaken by the allied States. However, since 
the intervention in Libya was conducted for humanitarian purposes, it would ordinarily have had 
to follow the principle of neutrality and avoid assisting one or the other side’s military efforts. 
The interpretation of the legal mandate in Resolution 1973 thus acquires critical importance. It 
has long been understood that obligations imposed by the Security Council acting under Chapter 
VII of the UN Charter trump any conflicting international law obligations.111 Therefore, the 
authorisation of the Security Council would override any commitment to the principle of 
neutrality the intervening States would otherwise have under international law, provided, of 
course, that it would allow them to associate with a party to the conflict. 
It would be incorrect to describe the resolution as entirely neutral vis-à-vis the conflict 
parties. It expressly condemned acts of violence perpetrated by the government forces and 
remained silent with respect to the conduct of the insurgents.112 It strengthened and extended the 
asset freeze of persons closely associated with the regime imposed by the preceding Resolution 
1970.113 It further extended the travel ban, again imposed by Resolution 1970, to additional 
representatives of the regime.114 None of these restrictions were applicable to persons associated 
with the other conflict party.  
Nevertheless, the resolution did not authorise the use of force to assist the insurgents in 
their armed struggle or even to remove Gaddafi’s regime altogether.115 An express authorisation 
of this sort was given by the Council during the Haiti crisis in the early 1990s when it authorised 
Member States ‘to form a multinational force’ and ‘to use all necessary means to facilitate the 
departure from Haiti of the military leadership [and] the prompt return of the legitimately elected 
President’.116 In contrast, Resolution 1973 was much more restrictive in its terms: 
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[Security Council a]uthorizes Member States that have notified the Secretary-
General, acting nationally or through regional organizations or arrangements, and 
acting in cooperation with the Secretary-General, to take all necessary measures, 
notwithstanding paragraph 9 of resolution 1970 (2011), to protect civilians and civilian 
populated areas under threat of attack in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, including Benghazi, while 
excluding a foreign occupation force of any form on any part of Libyan territory[.]117 
 
The mandate to protect civilians, without siding with one of the conflict parties, is in line with 
most of the recent practice of the Security Council.118 Still, several abstaining members expressed 
their concern that the resolution left unclear the extent to which enforcement measures could be 
used permissibly under the resolution.119 For the same reasons as above, it is submitted here that 
any ambiguity left by the wording of a Council resolution should be construed restrictively 
against a broad use of force, in order to allow only the minimum force necessary to achieve the 
goals stated in the resolution.120  
In the first weeks of the intervention, it appeared that this approach was also adopted by the 
intervening States. In early April, NATO warned the rebels not to target civilians and threatened 
them that such attacks would be followed with retaliatory strikes.121 In the same period, the 
rebels reported feeling ‘disappointed’ by NATO for not heeding their requests to strike against 
particular government targets.122 In the early phases of the conflict it thus appeared plausible that 
as soon as the situation would be stabilised and the civilians put out of immediate danger, 
outside use of force would cease. 
Although there had been some earlier calls for Gaddafi to step down,123 the position of the 
intervening States began to shift following the publication in mid-April of an influential open 
letter signed by the American and French presidents and the British prime minister.124 In it, they 
pledged to maintain military pressure on Gaddafi’s government until a transition process would 
take place in Libya, emphasising expressly that in order for that transition to succeed, ‘Gaddafi 
must go, and go for good’.125 The informal Libya contact group—which counted among its 
members all of the intervening States—appropriated this position soon after and continued to 
openly call for the end of Gaddafi’s regime.126 
These proclamations were accompanied by corresponding action on the ground. 
Abandoning their initial hesitation, international forces provided the insurgents with unyielding 
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aerial support in their struggle to defeat Gaddafi. According to some reports, a joint operations 
centre was established in Benghazi with the aim to ‘coordinate and make more effective the 
processing of military and tactical information back to NATO’.127 During the battle of Tripoli, 
NATO destroyed the building of the Libyan state television, poignantly described by the New 
York Times as ‘a purely political tool that only directly threatened civilians perhaps by boring 
them’.128 Finally, the air strikes continued even after the fall of the capital and after the loyalists 
retreated into the cities of Sirte and Bani Walid, at a time when any claims of Gaddafi posing a 
threat to the civilians became very difficult to justify. 
One of the States that voted in favour of Resolution 1973, South Africa made a strong 
proclamation in June 2011 emphasising that its intention at the time of the vote had been ‘to 
ensure the protection of civilians as well as unhindered access to humanitarian aid’ but ‘never 
regime change’.129 Similar complaints that the mandate had been overstepped came from States 
that had initially abstained.130 Although according to Russia, NATO was requested to submit a 
report on its compliance with the mandate, this had not been done.131 It thus appears fairly safe 
to conclude that the Security Council mandate had not been respected during the Libyan 
conflict132 and that instead, a coup d’état humanitaire took place there.133 
Correspondingly, the non-neutral implementation of the mandate contributed to the 
weakening of the principle of neutrality of humanitarian action. In addition, the prospects of 
Security Council-authorised humanitarian action in similar situations in the future have probably 
diminished because countries known for their more conservative approach to UN-mandated use 
of force such as China and Russia have grown even more wary of the risk that the agreed 
mandate would be stretched beyond expectation.134 
 
2. Blurring the lines 
Traditionally, there was a clear dividing line between the categories of actors who were involved 
in a conflict and those responding to it. This division safeguarded the neutrality and impartiality 
of humanitarian aid as the agents of response did not share the political motivations of the 
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agents involved in the conflict. As intergovernmental organisations gradually took on both of 
these roles in modern conflicts, they came under fire for blurring the traditional lines. In this 
subsection, we look at the extent to which three key intergovernmental players—NATO, the 
UN, and the EU—succeeded in maintaining the separation of their various roles in Libya. 
Leaving aside the question of the use of force discussed above, as for humanitarian aid 
narrowly understood, NATO was a relatively straightforward case. Consistent with its 
predominantly military character, it portrayed its role as enabling of humanitarian assistance, but 
not as direct provision of aid to the conflict parties. Even before the intervention, NATO 
announced that it was moving additional ships into the region to support humanitarian assistance 
efforts.135 NATO’s own statistics speak of over 2,500 air, ground, and maritime movements of 
humanitarian character being ‘de-conflicted’ (or provided with safe passage) by the Alliance.136 
Although arguments have been made to the effect that NATO’s role was not limited to maritime 
and aerial operations under the Security Council mandate, NATO never brought ground troops 
into Libya to protect humanitarian convoys on land.137 Notably, such deployment was also 
opposed by the Libyan government, even after it concluded the April humanitarian agreement 
allowing unimpeded access for humanitarian aid into Libya.138  
There have been some indications that NATO prioritised on some occasions its military 
objectives over the humanitarian needs of the civilian population. The most prominent of these 
was the case of the ‘left-to-die boat’ with 72 people on board who had been drifting at sea for 
over two weeks in March and April without fuel, food, or drinking water, before washing up on 
the Libyan shores with only nine survivors. The harrowing fate of the escapees attracted media 
attention and resulted in an extensive report by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of 
Europe.139 The report shows that although the drifting rubber boat had been in the vicinity of at 
least two NATO military vessels, the Alliance failed to react to the distress calls and left the 
passengers to their own devices.140 According to the report, this failure was a consequence of the 
general lack of preparations for the foreseeable exodus of people fleeing the conflict.141 If the 
factual assessment in the report is correct, NATO’s conduct would amount to a violation of its 
law of the sea obligations to search and rescue persons in distress.142 However, it appears to 
confirm that NATO did not see its role as a direct humanitarian actor in the Libyan conflict and 
consequently did not significantly contribute to the blurring of the lines analysed in this 
subsection. 
The UN found itself in a more precarious situation. It had to reconcile its role as, on the one 
hand, the organisation providing the mandate to use force inside Libya, including against the 
government forces and installations, and, on the other hand, the organisation tasked to provide 
humanitarian relief to the conflict victims on both sides. At a meeting of relief agencies in Cairo 
in June 2011, Panos Moumtzis, the UN humanitarian coordinator for Libya, acknowledged this 
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challenge and noted that ‘the humanitarian team carries the same UN flag as the Security 
Council’.143  
Nevertheless, the UN confirmed on several occasions its commitment to the principles of 
impartiality and neutrality of humanitarian action with respect to the Libyan conflict.144 UN 
representatives maintained constant contact with both sides145 and succeeded in convincing the 
conflict parties to permit access for humanitarian agencies to all areas of Libya.146  
Conversely, the perception of the UN as a strictly neutral humanitarian actor was put to 
doubt by its simultaneous preparation for a post-Gaddafi era. In April 2011, the UN established 
the position of Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on Post-Conflict Planning for Libya and 
appointed Ian Martin to fill it. He then seamlessly became the head of the United Nations 
Support Mission for Libya (UNSMIL) when it was created by the Security Council in September 
2011 at the behest of the new Libyan authorities.147 Through Mr Martin and later UNSMIL, the 
UN focused on development goals and political stabilisation, thus going beyond strict neutrality, 
considering that such aims inevitably favoured the victorious side in the civil war.  
This degree of two-facedness likely contributed towards some of the domestic backlash 
against the organisation. In a notable incident that followed the death of the son of Muammar 
Gaddafi, Saif al-Arab, in a NATO bombing in April 2011, the UN office in Tripoli was 
ransacked by angry local mobs, leading to the temporary withdrawal of all international staff.148 
We may thus conclude that the UN struggled to maintain a clear-cut and understandable 
separation of its strictly humanitarian and other broader roles during the Libyan conflict. 
Finally, the activity of the EU can be given somewhat better marks from the perspective of 
role separation. Since the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty, the EU benefits from a clear legal basis 
outlining the principles underlying its humanitarian action and separating the humanitarian 
objectives from other foreign policy goals of the Union.149 It has thus introduced an explicit 
Union competence in the field of humanitarian aid relating to the provision of ‘ad hoc assistance 
and relief and protection for people in third countries who are victims of natural or man-made 
disasters’.150 Such operations by the EU must ‘be conducted in compliance with the principles of 
international law and with the principles of impartiality, neutrality and non-discrimination’.151 
In Libya, the need for this separation was acutely felt. The EU participated through its 
foreign policy arm, the External Action Service, in the anti-Gaddafi contact group and it 
consistently maintained an anti-Gaddafi position in the public proclamations of its 
representatives.152 These actions clearly overstep the boundaries of the principle of neutrality. 
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However, EU’s humanitarian arm, the Directorate-General for Humanitarian Aid and Civil 
Protection of the European Commission (known under the acronym of its predecessor as 
ECHO153), maintained that it operated independently from the External Action Service and that 
it was ‘blind to political, religious, or any other considerations’.154 ECHO disbursed assistance 
totalling over €80m in the form of emergency aid and repatriation operations.155 It did so mainly 
through partner organisations whose dedication to neutrality and impartiality has long been 
established, including the ICRC, the IOM, and the UNHCR.156 The ICRC President Jakob 
Kellenberger himself accepted that the funding priorities of ECHO were ‘one of the best proofs’ 
of its attachment to the principles of humanitarian action.157 Legal and operational separation of 
humanitarian aid from other foreign policy priorities thus seemed to have dispelled concerns 
over impartiality and neutrality of EU humanitarian action in the Libyan conflict.158 
 
IV. Conclusion 
There is no doubt that humanitarian principles of impartiality and neutrality carry great 
importance even in the aftermath of the Libyan conflict. Both sides of the conflict certainly bear 
their share of responsibility for preventing humanitarian access to the victims on the ground. 
However, without the general understanding that humanitarian agents do not, or at least should 
not, have any other loyalty except to the persons in need, even the limited observance of the law 
would become illusory. We must therefore learn from the lessons of Libya to protect these 
principles for the future. 
For the States that are not directly affected by the conflict as it is not taking place in their 
territory, these lessons may be drawn on two levels. First, the aid they decide to provide to a 
conflict-stricken country should not quantitatively favour one of the conflict sides nor should it 
exceed what can qualitatively be considered legitimate humanitarian aid. Second, if there is a 
Security Council mandate allowing outside States to intervene to protect the civilians affected by 
the conflict, its implementation should be based on a restrictive interpretation of its terms. To do 
otherwise means to risk that the Council will be unwilling to permit similar action in future 
crises, as has been demonstrated by the unfortunate Syrian situation so soon after Libya. 
It is a sad role of the academic to point to the violations committed by the conflict parties 
while being fully aware that future conflicts will hardly be much different. However, even this 
cloud has a silver lining. Both conflict parties in Libya have formally acknowledged their 
acceptance of IHL obligations relating to humanitarian access and neither of them has attempted 
to claim that these duties would be unfair or unfeasible for reasons of military necessity. 
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Similarly, they have not claimed a right only to allow aid to ‘their own’ civilian population; on the 
contrary, if the alleged violations were reacted upon in any way by the belligerents, it was to deny 
that anything like that had happened. The principles and the rules relating to humanitarian action 
thus survive intact and even reaffirmed by this conduct as it is rather their implementation that 
was found wanting. 
Finally, some good practice can be identified in the conduct of the international 
organisations involved in the Libyan conflict. ‘Dunantist’ agencies such as the ICRC and MSF 
have again shown that it is principally possible to act in an impartial and neutral way, although 
their efforts were certainly hampered in many ways by other actors on the ground. The EU has 
served as a positive example of a multi-purpose actor capable of satisfactory legal and 
operational separation of its humanitarian and non-humanitarian roles. Conversely, NATO and 
UN involvement in the conflict rather put the principles of impartiality and neutrality under 
further strain on account of the far-reaching interpretation of the Security Council mandate by 
NATO and the UN’s blurring of lines between its various roles. 
Humanitarian principles of impartiality and neutrality have certainly not died in Libya. 
Commitment to them as to fundamental principles of humanitarian action has been confirmed 
by virtually all key actors in that conflict. Likewise, the conduct of many of them has indeed been 
guided by these principles. At the same time, it is undeniable that the Libyan events have put 
these principles under considerable strain. It was the aim of this chapter to highlight the most 
notable of those instances and thus contribute in a modest way to the strengthening of these 
principles in the future. 
